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ESSAY 
You Get What You Pay For:  
An Empirical Examination of the Use 
of MTurk in Legal Scholarship 
Adriana Z. Robertson*  
Albert H. Yoon** 
In recent years, legal scholars have come to rely on Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (“MTurk”) platform to recruit participants for surveys and 
experiments. Despite MTurk’s popularity, there is no generally accepted 
methodology for its use in legal scholarship, and many questions remain about 
the validity of data gathered from this source. In particular, little is known 
about how the compensation structure affects the performance of respondents 
recruited using MTurk.  
This Essay fills both of these gaps. We develop an experiment and test 
the effect of various compensation structures on performance along two 
dimensions: effort and attention. We find that both the level and the structure 
of the compensation scheme have substantial effects on the performance of 
MTurk workers, and that these effects differ across question types. We then 
propose a series of best practices for scholars to follow in conducting research 
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using MTurk. Adoption of these guidelines will improve both the transparency 
and the robustness of research conducted using this platform.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Legal scholars have long been criticized for their propensity to 
navel-gaze.1 The degree to which legal scholarship is useful or even 
relevant to anyone outside a narrow slice of legal academia has been 
questioned by both academics2 and judges, including Chief Justice 
Roberts of the U.S. Supreme Court.3 Perhaps partly in response to these 
concerns, there has been a move in recent years to inject some “real-
world” grounding into legal scholarship. One common example of this 
is the rise of the use of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (“MTurk”) platform 
as a means of tethering academic ideas to the lives, beliefs, and 
reactions of ordinary individuals.  
Over the last ten years, law reviews and other scholarly legal 
publications have published dozens of articles that rely on data 
gathered using MTurk.4 Some of these applications are purely survey-
based—where the primary objective is to collect information about the 
thoughts, perceptions, and beliefs of ordinary individuals—while others 
 
 1. For perhaps the first instance of this, see Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. 
REV. 38, 43 (1937): 
Law review writers seem to rank among our most adept navel-gazers. When they are 
not busy adding to and patching up their lists of cases and their farflung lines of logic, 
so that some smart practising lawyer can come along and grab the cases and the logic 
without so much as a by-your-leave, they are sure to be found squabbling earnestly 
among themselves over the meaning or content of some obscure principle that nine 
judges out of ten would not even recognize if it hopped up and slugged them in the face.  
For a more recent article surveying the literature and proposing “an incremental contribution,” 
see generally Michael Klinger, Escape from the Navel-Gazing Academy: A Modest Proposal for 
Student-Edited Legal Scholarship, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 179 (2015).  
 2. See, e.g., Rodell, supra note 1, at 44; LawProfBlawg, Why Do Law Professors Write Law 
Review Articles?, ABOVE LAW (May 9, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/05/why-do-
law-professors-write-law-review-articles/ [https://perma.cc/7XMR-C68J] (asking why law profes-
sors write law review articles); see also Stephen Bainbridge, “Why Do Law Professors Write Law 
Review Articles?” Is the Wrong Question, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 11, 2017, 2:29 PM), 
https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2017/05/why-do-law-professors-
write-law-review-articles-is-the-wrong-question.html [https://perma.cc/S7QC-UHRD] (responding 
to LawProfBlawg). 
 3. Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Prof Responds After Chief Justice Roberts Disses Legal Schol-
arship, A.B.A. J. (Jul. 7, 2011, 10:29 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ law_prof_re-
sponds_after_chief_justice_roberts_disses_legal_scholarship [https://perma.cc/3XSH-BLFZ]. 
Weiss quotes Chief Justice Roberts as having said: 
Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and the first article is likely to be, you 
know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th Century Bul-
garia, or something, which I’m sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it, 
but isn’t of much help to the bar. 
 4. See discussion infra notes 25–40 and accompanying text. 
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are more experimental in nature.5 There are compelling reasons for 
MTurk’s popularity: it is both faster and cheaper than most survey or 
experimental techniques, often allowing researchers to obtain hundreds 
of results in a few hours for only a few hundred dollars.6 Despite its 
relatively recent origins,7 MTurk has increasingly gained acceptance 
among legal scholars, and articles relying on MTurk data have been 
published in some of the leading law reviews.8  
Questions remain, however, about the quality of the data 
obtained through MTurk. We believe that two concerns are particularly 
acute. The first relates to the compensation offered to MTurk 
participants. While part of what makes MTurk an attractive platform 
is precisely the fact that it is far cheaper than other available options, 
this advantage may come with its own nonpecuniary costs. For 
example, individuals who are being paid substantially below minimum 
wage may not be particularly invested in the questions and may provide 
answers that do not reflect their true preferences or beliefs. Moreover, 
given the extensive literature on the sensitivity of individual behavior 
to incentives,9 the structure of any compensation offered, in addition to 
its level, is likely to have important implications for participant 
behavior. In particular, we distinguish between questions and tasks 
that require individuals to exert effort (that is, to think hard about their 
answers) and those that require them to pay attention (that is, to read 
the text of the question carefully). We contend that the optimal 
compensation structure may vary across these question types.  
 
 5. See discussion infra Part II. 
 6. See discussion infra Part II.  
 7. See discussion infra Part II.  
 8. Examples of such journals include the Yale Law Journal, see, for example, Elizabeth In-
griselli, Mitigating Jurors’ Racial Biases: The Effects of Content and Timing of Jury 
Instructions, 124 YALE L.J. 1690 (2015); the Columbia Law Review, see, for example, Ryan Calo & 
Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623 
(2017); the Georgetown Law Journal, see, for example, Justin Sevier, Popularizing Hearsay, 104 
GEO. L.J. 643 (2016); and the New York University Law Review, see, for example David A. Hoff-
man, From Promise to Form: How Contracting Online Changes Consumers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1595 
(2016). 
 9. See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 7 (4th ed. 2007) (listing ten 
key principles of economics, the fourth of which is “people respond to incentives”). Most recently, 
economists have established that individuals will work longer in response to financial incentives 
to delay retirement. See, e.g., Kadir Atalay & Garry F. Barrett, The Impact of Age Pension Eligi-
bility Age on Retirement and Program Dependence: Evidence from an Australian Experiment, 97 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 71 (2014); Courtney C. Coile & Jonathan Gruber, Future Social Security En-
titlements and the Retirement Decision, 89 REV. ECON. & STAT. 234 (2007). 
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Our second, and more subtle, concern relates to the way in which 
the findings of studies relying on MTurk are often presented in law 
reviews. At present, there appear to be no widely accepted norms 
regarding what information authors are expected to provide about their 
empirical methodologies. While the amount of disclosure varies widely 
across articles, the vast majority provide very little discussion of how 
the survey or experiment was actually conducted. While there may be 
good reasons why authors chose to limit this discussion—including a 
desire not to clutter the body of the article with details that many 
readers may view as extraneous to the article’s main argument—this 
opacity makes it very difficult for other scholars to interpret or evaluate 
the results of these studies, limiting their potential impact. 
Many law review articles use MTurk to ask questions that are 
subjective in nature—questions about the respondents’ opinions, their 
feelings about a particular topic, or questions for which there is no 
obviously correct answer. Even in this context, to the extent that the 
researcher cares about collecting responses from participants who have 
paid attention to the questions, the level of compensation may matter. 
Even if an answer is not wrong per se, answers from inattentive 
participants may introduce noise or bias to data.   
In this Essay, we seek to address these concerns.  Using an 
experimental methodology that we discuss in detail in Section II.A, we 
first test the implications of varying the compensation structure on the 
performance of participants recruited using MTurk. We find that both 
the level and the structure of the offered compensation have substantial 
implications for performance, and that these implications vary 
depending on whether the tasks in question primarily require effort or 
attention. We discuss these results in Sections II.B and II.C. 
Drawing on our experimental results, we then propose a list of 
best practices that scholars should employ when using MTurk for legal 
scholarship. These proposals are straightforward to implement, and we 
believe that doing so would dramatically improve the reliability of 
articles based on MTurk data.  
The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, we 
introduce the MTurk platform and discuss its extensive use in legal 
scholarship. In Part II, we discuss our experiment, including our 
experimental design and results, and then interpret those results. In 
Part III, we propose a series of best practices for the use of MTurk in 
legal scholarship, in light of recent uses of the platform.    
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I. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. About MTurk 
Its popularity among researchers notwithstanding, MTurk was 
originally designed for a very different purpose. Amazon created MTurk 
in 2005 as a way to recruit people to help the company identify duplicate 
pages on its website.10 At the time, humans could perform these types 
of tasks more easily than machines. Curiously, its etymology comes 
from the eighteenth-century chess-playing automaton that was later 
revealed to be a hoax: a human chess master controlled the machine.11 
Shortly after MTurk’s creation, Amazon opened it up to third 
parties and the platform has effectively turned into a broker between 
prospective hirers and prospective workers.12 Hirers, known as 
“requesters,” can post tasks, known as “Human Intelligence Tasks” 
(“HITs”), on the platform, along with stated compensation, after which 
each eligible worker can decide which HITs to accept.13 Upon 
completion of the HIT, MTurk handles the payment to the workers on 
behalf of the requester.14 Because all workers who register to use the 
platform are asked to provide demographic information, requesters can 
also set eligibility criteria for their workers.15 As the broker between 
requesters and workers, MTurk takes a commission of the stated 
compensation: it began with 10% and subsequently raised that to 20% 
in 2015, charging an additional 20% for tasks involving more than ten 
people.16  
Since its creation, MTurk has grown dramatically. By 2007, over 
one hundred thousand MTurk workers participated from over one 
hundred countries.17 In 2017, Amazon reported that total workers had 
 
 10. See Jason Pontin, Artificial Intelligence, With Help from the Humans, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
25, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/25/business/yourmoney/25Stream.html [https:// 
perma.cc/C5ZN-HPHX]. 
 11. See id. 
 12. For a description of the registration process, see Adam J. Berinsky et al., Evaluating 
Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. 
ANALYSIS 351, 352–53 (2012). 
 13. Id. at 352. 
 14. Id. at 353. 
 15. See id. at 352. 
 16. See Jillian D’Onfro, Amazon Just Increased Prices on a Service You’ve Probably Never 
Heard of, and Some Researchers Are Really Upset, BUS. INSIDER (June 23, 2015, 8:39 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-mechanical-turk-price-changes 
[https://perma.cc/LW8R-ZWN5]. 
 17. See Pontin, supra note 10. 
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exceeded five hundred thousand.18 Workers are heavily concentrated in 
two countries: the United States, with 75%, and India, with 16%.19 
B. MTurk in Legal Scholarship 
Despite its origins in more traditional labor markets, MTurk 
soon became popular among academics. Traditionally, when conducting 
research experiments with human subjects, academics interacted 
personally with those subjects. Members of the general population were 
invited to participate in some studies, but often researchers drew on 
undergraduate students. Reliance on this nonrepresentative population 
prompted concern among some researchers.20 MTurk afforded 
researchers a way to address at least three central limitations of 
traditional research: it made recruiting participants cheaper, made it 
easier to draw from a diverse population,21 and made it possible to 
conduct the experiment in a shorter time frame.  
Social science scholars were early adopters of MTurk in their 
studies. For example, political scientists conducted experiments with 
MTurk workers to determine factors that influence voting patterns.22 
Economists surveyed MTurk workers for their perception of market 
 
 18. See Djellel Difallah, Elena Filatova & Pano Ipeirotis, Demographics and Dynamics of Me-
chanical Turk Workers, Address before  WSDM 2018: The Eleventh ACM International Confer-
ence on Web Search and Data Mining § 1 n.2 (Feb. 2018), https://ipeirotis.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/12/wsdmf074-difallahA.pdf [https://perma.cc/47F2-ZR6N] (noting their own findings 
that the number of workers is in the 100,000–200,000 range).  
 19. See id. § 3.2 (reporting that aside from Canada (1.1%), the remaining countries each com-
prise less than 1% of workers). 
 20. See Michael Buhrmester et al., Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A New Source of Inexpensive, 
Yet High-Quality, Data? 6 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 3, 4 (2011) (“Commentators have long lamented 
the heavy reliance on American college samples.”). 
 21. See Erin C. Cassese et al., Socially Mediated Internet Surveys: Recruiting Participants for 
Online Experiments, 46 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 775, 776 (2013) (describing greater diversity of MTurk 
participation than the typical student convenience sample). 
 22. See, e.g., Stig Hebbelstrup Rye Rasmussen, Cognitive Ability Rivals the Effect of Political 
Sophistication on Ideological Voting, 69 POL. RES. Q. 773 (2016) (finding through MTurk workers 
a positive correlation of cognitive ability on ideological voting); Lars J. Lefgren et al., Effort, Luck, 
and Voting for Redistribution, 143 J. PUB. ECON. 89, 95 (2016) (finding that over a quarter of 
MTurk workers were willing to vote against their self-interest and favor groups who exhibited 
more effort). 
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transactions.23 Psychologists, surveying MTurk workers, explored the 
origins of social comparison.24  
As MTurk gained traction in the social sciences, its use spread 
to legal scholarship. Based on a recent search using Lexis Advance, we 
identified no fewer than ninety-eight articles involving the use of 
MTurk participants in either a survey or experimental context.25 
Within the past five years alone, legal scholars have used MTurk to 
study administrative regulation,26 alternative dispute resolution,27 
bankruptcy,28 constitutional law,29 consumer protection,30 contracts,31 
 
 23. See, e.g., Sandro Ambuehl et al., More Money, More Problems? Can High Pay be Coercive 
and Repugnant?, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 357, 359 (2015) (finding that MTurk workers viewed in-kind 
incentives, rather than money, as more ethical). 
 24. See, e.g., Matthew Baldwin & Thomas Mussweiler, The Culture of Social Comparison, 
PNAS (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.pnas.org/content/115/39/E9067 [https://perma.cc/S4AK-DP33] 
(finding that social comparison plays an essential role in the development of social life). 
 25. To identify the universe of relevant articles, we ran a search on Lexis Advance for the 
term “MTurk” on December 19, 2018. This search returned 150 hits in the category of “Secondary 
Materials,” which we downloaded and reviewed. Of these 150 articles, 98 involved an original 
MTurk survey conducted by the author(s). 
 26. See, e.g., Victor D. Quintanilla, Taboo Procedural Tradeoffs: Examining How the Public 
Experiences Tradeoffs Between Procedural Justice and Cost, 15 NEV. L.J. 882 (2015) (using MTurk 
to evaluate views on procedural regulation); Edward H. Stiglitz, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Public 
Sector Trust, 24 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 169 (2016) (finding through MTurk surveys that agency use 
of cost-benefit analysis increases public sector trust). 
 27. See, e.g., Victor D. Quintanilla & Alexander B. Avtgis, The Public Believes Predispute 
Binding Arbitration Clauses Are Unjust: Ethical Implications for Dispute-System Design in the 
Time of Vanishing Trials, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2119 (2017) (using MTurk to observe how the public 
perceives taboo procedural tradeoffs). 
 28. See, e.g., Dov Cohen et al., Opposite of Correct: Inverted Insider Perceptions of Race and 
Bankruptcy, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 623 (2017) (using MTurk to determine perceptions on differences 
in base rates of chapter 13 bankruptcy filings). 
 29. See, e.g., Eileen Braman, Exploring Citizen Assessments of Unilateral Executive Author-
ity, 50 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 189 (2016) (using MTurk to evaluate the interaction between constitu-
tional considerations and democratic context when evaluating executive authority); David S. Co-
hen & Jeffrey B. Bingenheimer, Abortion Rights and the Largeness of the Fraction 1/6, 164 U. PA. 
L. REV. ONLINE 115 (2016) (using MTurk to evaluate how the public perceives circuit court doctrine 
on abortion); Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Public Perceptions of Government 
Speech, 2017 SUP. CT. REV. 33 (2017) (using MTurk to determine how the public perceives monu-
ments as government speech); Jonathon W. Penney, Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wik-
ipedia Use, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117 (2016) (surveying MTurk workers on their perceptions of 
privacy through Wikipedia use). 
 30. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches Between 
Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39 (2015) (surveying MTurk workers 
for their understanding of privacy policies). 
 31. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Psychology of Contract Precau-
tions, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 395 (2013) (surveying MTurk workers to understand how perceived final-
ity of the contract influences parties’ self-protective behavior). 
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criminal law,32 election law,33 environmental law,34 evidence,35 
intellectual property,36 labor and employment,37 securities,38 tax,39 and 
torts.40 
  As it has become more widely used, MTurk has garnered its share 
of criticism. Detractors suggest that MTurk is exploitative, describing 
 
 32. See, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Defending the Dog, 91 OR. L. REV. 1203 (2013) (surveying 
MTurk workers for their views toward narcotics dogs as a means of enforcement); Michael D. Cic-
chini & Lawrence T. White, Testing the Impact of Criminal Jury Instructions on Verdicts: A Con-
ceptual Replication, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 22 (2017) (surveying MTurk workers to identify 
sensitivity to jury instructions); Brandon L. Garrett & Gregory Mitchell, Forensics and Fallibility: 
Comparing the Views of Lawyers and Jurors, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 621 (2016) (using MTurk to gauge 
how juries perceive forensic evidence in criminal trials); Ingriselli, supra note 8 (surveying MTurk 
workers to evaluate juror bias against criminal defendants); Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. Good-
win & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940 (2010) (using MTurk 
to understand determinants that influence the public’s perceptions of moral credibility in the crim-
inal justice system); Francis X. Shen, Minority Mens Rea: Racial Bias and Criminal Mental States, 
68 HASTINGS L.J. 1007 (2017) (surveying MTurk workers to understand jury views toward mens 
rea); Roseanna Sommers, Will Putting Cameras on Police Reduce Polarization?, 125 YALE L.J. 
1304 (2016) (using MTurk to evaluate public perceptions of police cameras); Avani Mehta Sood, 
Cognitive Cleansing: Experimental Psychology and the Exclusionary Rule, 103 GEO. L.J. 1543 
(2013) (surveying MTurk workers for divergence between Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and 
societal norms). 
 33. See, e.g., Michael J. Nelson, Is There a Silver Lining? Dark Money and Support for State 
Courts, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 187 (2018) (using MTurk to understand public attitudes toward dark 
money in elections). 
 34. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein et al., How People Update Beliefs About Climate Change: Good 
News and Bad News, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1431 (2017) (using MTurk to understand how the public 
updates beliefs on global warming); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Kaitlin T. Raimi, Climate Change: 
Leveraging Legacy, 42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 139 (2015) (surveying MTurk to understand public percep-
tion of legacy concerns to address climate change). 
 35. See, e.g., Brandon Garrett & Gregory Mitchell, How Jurors Evaluate Fingerprint Evi-
dence: The Relative Importance of Match Language, Method Information, and Error Acknowledg-
ment, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 484 (2013) (using MTurk to understand juror attitudes toward 
fingerprint identification in criminal trials); Justin Sevier, Evidentiary Trapdoors, 103 IOWA L. 
REV. 1155 (2018) (surveying MTurk workers to explore how jurors perceive inconsistencies be-
tween the plain reading of a rule and its application); Sevier, supra note 8 (using MTurk to under-
stand how jurors respond to hearsay evidence); Justin Sevier, Testing Tribe’s Triangle: Juries, 
Hearsay, and Psychological Distance, 103 GEO. L.J. 879 (2015) (same). 
 36. See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & Paul J. Heald, Do Bad Things Happen When Works 
Enter the Public Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1 (2013) (surveying MTurk to assess views on extension of copyright terms); Gregory N. Mandel et 
al., Intellectual Property Law’s Plagiarism Fallacy, 2015 BYU L. REV. 915 (surveying MTurk work-
ers for views on plagiarism in copyright cases); David L. Schwartz & Christopher B. Seaman, 
Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Experiment from Patent Law, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429 
(2013) (using MTurk to evaluate jury instructions’ effect on the presumption of validity in patent 
cases); Christopher Jon Sprigman et al., What’s a Name Worth?: Experimental Tests of the Value 
of Attribution in Intellectual Property, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1389 (2013) (using MTurk to understand 
public perceptions of attribution). 
 37. See, e.g., Joni Hersh & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Something to Talk About: Information 
Exchange Under Employment Law, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 49 (2016) (surveying MTurk workers to see 
how the disclosure of family status affects employment prospects). 
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it as resembling what a “labor market would look like without minimum 
wages or labor law protections.”41 The majority of MTurk workers earn 
considerably less than the federal minimum wage,42 yet a quarter of 
MTurk workers identify this work as their primary source of income.43 
One early critic described MTurk as a “virtual sweatshop.”44 Moreover, 
because they are, by design, independent contractors, MTurk workers 
do not receive any benefits that employees typically enjoy, such as sick 
leave, vacation time, parental leave, or an employer-sponsored 
retirement plan. While competitors professing to treat workers with 
greater dignity have emerged, 45 MTurk remains the market leader.46  
Skeptics within academia have also pointed to more 
methodological concerns about relying on MTurk. Some point to 
potential overexposure of MTurk workers to academic studies: for  
example, scholars have found that the median MTurk worker had 
participated in several studies a week, and hundreds of studies over the 
 
 38. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mis-
takes? An Experiment on Mutual Fund Choice, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 605 (2014) (surveying MTurk 
workers on the effect of information on individuals’ retirement planning). 
 39. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Voluntary Taxation and Beyond: The Promise of Social-Contracting 
Voting Mechanisms, 19 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2017) (using MTurk to evaluate public perception 
of voluntary taxation); Emily Satterthwaite, Can Audits Encourage Tax Evasion?: An Experi-
mental Assessment, 20 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2016) (using MTurk to determine the effect of random 
audits on tax compliance). 
 40. See, e.g., John Campbell et al., Countering the Plaintiff’s Anchor: Jury Simulations to 
Evaluate Damages Arguments, 101 IOWA L. REV. 543 (2016) (surveying MTurk workers for the 
effect of anchoring on damages awards); Justin Sevier, Vicarious Windfalls, 102 IOWA L. REV. 651 
(2017) (using MTurk to evaluate how jurors view vicarious liability when assessing damages). 
 41. Nancy Folbre, The Unregulated Work of Mechanical Turk, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Mar. 
18, 2003, 6:00 AM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/the-unregulated-work-of-me-
chanical-turk [https://perma.cc/KRU3-K38B]. 
 42. See Paul Hitlin, Turkers in this Canvassing: Young, Well-Educated, and Frequent Users, 
PEW RES. CTR. (July 11, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/07/11/turkers-in-this-canvassing-
young-well-educated-and-frequent-users/ [https://perma.cc/E7PD-349V] (reporting that most 
MTurk workers earn less than $5 an hour, compared with the $7.25 federal minimum wage). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Katharine Mieszkowski, I Make $1.45 a Week and I Love It, SALON (July 24, 2006, 5:00 
PM), https://www.salon.com/2006/07/24/turks_3/ [https://perma.cc/UQ6H-E9VM]. 
 45. For example, Daemo was created to serve as an academic crowdwork environment offer-
ing a constitution to dynamically reflect worker interests and empower more equitable crowdsourc-
ing. See As Amazon’s ‘Mechanical Turks’ Push for Better Conditions, a New Platform Emerges to 
Court Them, GARTNER (Aug. 24, 2017, 4:32 PM), https://www.cebglobal.com/talentdaily/as-ama-
zons-mechanical-turks-push-for-better-conditions-a-new-platform-emerges-to-court-them/ 
[https://perma.cc/QYZ2-6BS3]. 
 46. See Miranda Katz, This Startup is Challenging Mechanical Turk—on the Blockchain, 
WIRED (Feb. 23, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/this-startup-is-challenging-mechan-
ical-turkon-the-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/PYG8-4T69] (describing MTurk as the “Xerox of 
crowdwork”). 
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course of his or her lifetime.47 This overexposure runs the risk of 
compromising the integrity of academic surveys. More recently, 
researchers found that survey responses using MTurk were populated 
with nonsensical responses to open-ended questions and multiple 
responses from duplicate GPS locations.48 This trend, which suggests 
participation by bots rather than humans, challenges the legitimacy of 
MTurk as a survey research instrument.49 
While we recognize the importance of these issues, we examine 
MTurk from a different perspective. We focus on two very specific 
concerns that we think are particularly relevant to the use of MTurk by 
legal scholars and in legal publications. First, our review of the current 
legal literature revealed that studies rarely explained the reasoning 
behind the compensation structure offered to participants. Indeed, 
roughly half of the articles we reviewed did not even disclose the 
amount of compensation that MTurk workers received, and less than 
one-third disclosed the duration of the assignment, which would be 
necessary in order to estimate an imputed hourly rate.50  
Given both the concerns around exploitation51 and the well-
documented ways in which incentives can affect human behavior, we 
designed an experiment to test the relationship between compensation 
 
 47. See David G. Rand et al., Social Heuristics Shape Intuitive Cooperation, NATURE COMM. 
4 (Apr. 22, 2014), http://static1.squarespace.com/static/51ed234ae4b0867e2385d879/t/ 
5356700be4b0b8b008782885/1398173707675/social-heuristics-shape-intuitive-cooperation.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3E2L-G6US]. 
 48. See Emily Dreyfuss, A Bot Panic Hits Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, WIRED (Aug. 17, 2018, 
11:38 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-mechanical-turk-bot-panic/ [https://perma.cc/ 
273Q-VNBG]. 
 49. Given the design of our survey, described in detail below, we think it is unlikely that our 
results are vulnerable to bot participation. Our questions were open ended, and only a very small 
number of the responses we received were anything other than a facially plausible answer. An 
examination of IP addresses revealed 962 unique IP addresses out of one thousand respondents. 
The same IP address is never in the data more than four times (930 appear once, twenty-seven 
appear twice, four appear three times, and one appears four times). These relatively small num-
bers of repeat IP addresses are more plausibly explained by multiple people with different accounts 
working or residing at the same IP address, or perhaps, by a single human holding more than one 
account. 
 50. For these purposes, there are at least two different versions of the duration of an assign-
ment, both of which would be relevant for interpreting the implied hourly rate. The first is the 
amount of time that the researcher says that the assignment will take to complete. It is common 
for researchers to include in the HIT description an estimate of the time required to complete the 
assignment. Workers may interpret this stated duration as a signal of how long they are expected 
to spend on the assignment. Moreover, given that this information is provided to potential workers 
ex ante, it is plausible that they might use it to estimate their implied hourly compensation before 
deciding whether to accept the HIT. The second is the amount of time workers actually spent on 
the assignment, which is necessary to compute an ex post implied hourly rate.   
 51. See discussion supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.  
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structures and the performance of MTurk participants. In doing so, we 
designed the experiment to allow us to distinguish tasks that require 
individuals to exert effort from those that require them to pay attention, 
terms which we discuss in detail in the next Part.52 
Our second concern relates to the way in which studies relying 
on MTurk are presented in law reviews. Our review of the current 
literature makes it clear that there are no widely accepted norms about 
what kind of information law reviews expect authors to provide 
regarding their empirical methodologies. In most cases, even if there is 
a mention of the level of compensation offered, the articles spend very 
little time discussing how the survey or experiment was actually 
conducted, making it difficult for readers to evaluate, or even interpret, 
the results. In order to overcome this difficulty, we propose a series of 
guidelines for law journals and legal scholars to adopt.  
II. OUR EXPERIMENT 
Given our review of the use of MTurk in legal scholarship,53 the 
goal of our experiment is simple: to test the effects of different 
compensation structures on the performance of MTurk workers, both in 
terms of their effort and attention. 
A. Experimental Design  
To test the effect of compensation structures on the performance 
of MTurk workers, we administered the same questionnaire four times 
under four different HITs.54 Apart from the description of the 
compensation structure, the HITs were virtually identical.55 MTurk 
workers who had already completed one of our HITs were ineligible to 
 
 52. See infra Part II. 
 53. See supra Section I.B. 
 54. We considered, but decided against, a survey design that randomized the form of compen-
sation. Our research question examines how different compensation structures influence a re-
spondent’s willingness to undertake a task and how well she performs the task. To properly exam-
ine this question requires that the respondent know the compensation structure up front.   
 55. The only other material difference was the statement that if they had taken one of our 
prior surveys, they were not eligible. They were also told that they would be asked to enter their 
MTurk WorkerID to help determine eligibility. Any respondent that had completed a prior HIT 
was deemed ineligible for the final sample. By excluding repeat participation, we avoided bias 
(presumably upward, as workers improve on their initial performance) in subsequent variations 
of the test.  
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take another one.56 In addition to stating in the HIT that participants 
must reside in the United States, we employed the MTurk worker 
requirement function and required that MTurk participants be 
geographically located in the United States.57 All four of our HITs were 
posted between 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. eastern time (7:00 a.m. and 
8:00 a.m. pacific time) on either a Tuesday or a Thursday in December 
2018.58 After each HIT was posted, we waited until we had 250 eligible 
respondents59 before canceling the HIT.60  
The four different treatment groups allowed us to vary both the 
base pay and the existence of a bonus for correct answers. Group 1—the 
“low” group—was offered $0.50 for completing the questionnaire. Group 
2—the “low plus incentive” group—was offered $0.25 for completing the 
questionnaire, plus a bonus of $0.10 per correct answer. Because there 
 
 56. One potential risk in doing this is that, to the extent that this exclusion affects the com-
position of our sample, MTurk workers who are predisposed to participating in academic studies—
so called “superturkers”—are disproportionately likely to be in Group 1. We address this concern 
through the following: in our main specifications, we control for demographic variables such as 
education and income in an effort to make apples-to-apples comparisons. Of course, the possibility 
remains that individuals who most enjoy participating in academic studies differ along dimensions 
that are unobservable to us. However, these are precisely the MTurk workers who may have had 
prior exposure to some of our questions or styles of question, and/or are disproportionately likely 
to perform well on our questionnaire. This selection effect should therefore bias our results toward 
finding higher performance in Group 1, and lower performance in later groups such as Group 4. 
In fact, as discussed in more detail in Section II.B, we find the opposite pattern. See discussion 
infra Section II.B. This suggests that, if anything, our results understate the differences between 
groups that would be observed in the absence of this selection effect.  
 57. We stated in the HIT that workers must be at least eighteen years old and reside in the 
United States to participate. In addition to this, we used the worker requirement function because 
of evidence that a substantial proportion of the workers in MTurk are located outside the United 
States. See Difallah et al., supra note 18, at 3. Given that we were offering substantially above 
market compensation in Groups 3 and 4, we were concerned that, in the absence of this worker 
requirement, MTurk workers outside the United States might be tempted to misstate their resi-
dency in order to participate, thereby polluting our results. 
 58. The specific dates were December 6, 11, 13 and 18, 2018. In order to reduce the risk of 
contamination between treatments, we required that one full business day pass between when the 
last HIT was cancelled and the next HIT was posted. One HIT (Group 2) completed before midnight 
the day it was posted, which allowed us to post the next HIT (Group 3) two days later. The other 
three HITs were completed by mid-afternoon the day after they were posted. In total, it took 
roughly twenty-five hours for Group 1 to be complete, thirteen hours for Group 2, twenty-seven 
hours for Group 3, and twenty-nine hours for Group 4.  
 59. The MTurk HIT contained a link to a Qualtrics questionnaire. Once a participant had 
completed the survey, she was given a unique response code by Qualtrics and asked to enter it into 
the HIT. We matched the response codes provided by the MTurk workers with the original re-
sponse codes provided to them in the Qualtrics questionnaire. Only responses that matched were 
counted as eligible responses. 
 60. We had a few extra to ensure that we would end up with 250 eligible responses. In all 
four treatments, we ended up with a few more than 250 eligible responses. We kept the first 250 
eligible responses (by date and time submitted) and discarded the rest.  
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were ten questions in the questionnaire, the total potential 
compensation for participants was $1.25. Group 3—the “high” group—
was offered $1.50 for completing the questionnaire. Finally, Group 4—
the “high plus incentive” group—was offered $1.25 for completing the 
questionnaire, plus a bonus of $0.10 per correct answer, for a total 
possible compensation of $2.25. The compensation structure is 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1: COMPENSATION STRUCTURE BY TREATMENT GROUP 
Group Description Base  Compensation 
Maximum 
Bonus 
Group 1 Low, No Incentive $0.50 — 
Group 2 Low, Plus Incentive $0.25 $1.00 
Group 3 High, No Incentive $1.50 — 
Group 4 High, Plus Incentive $1.25 $1.00 
 
We advised potential participants that we expected the task to 
take approximately ten minutes to complete.61 This duration 
corresponds to an implied hourly rate of $3.00 for Group 1 and $9.00 for 
Group 3. Anecdotally, the “market” hourly rate on MTurk is 
approximately $6.00 per hour (or $1.00 per ten-minute task). We 
selected the compensation structure of Groups 1 and 3 to correspond to 
“below market” and “above market” rates on MTurk, respectively.  
After the consent page, our questionnaire contained a page 
collecting demographic characteristics, including gender, birth year, 
educational attainment, and income.62 Respondents then proceeded to 
the third page of the questionnaire, which contained the ten substantive 
questions, the order of which was randomized. Four of the questions 
involved solving mathematical problems. One related to numeracy, one 
to algebra, one to geometry, and one to order of operations.63 These 
questions are objective in nature and require mathematical 
computations of varying levels of difficulty. The other six involved basic 
logic. While these questions are also objective in nature, answering 
 
 61. As we discuss in more detail below, the average participant spent somewhat less than ten 
minutes completing the questionnaire. The average time spent was between 6.5 and 6.75 minutes 
for Groups 1 through 3, and about nine minutes for Group 4, using the winsorized variable. See 
infra Section II.B.   
 62. We also collected information on whether the individual was born in the U.S., state of 
residence, race, whether the individual is Hispanic, and employment status.  
 63. The first three of these were based on ninth-grade mathematics questions. The fourth 
was based on fifth-grade mathematics.  
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them correctly requires a careful reading of the question rather than 
mathematical computations. All but one of the questions were free-
response questions, where respondents were required to type in their 
answers.64 As we discuss in more detail in Section II.C, if anything, 
open-text fields are likely to mitigate any tendency towards inattention, 
since participants cannot quickly click through the way they could with 
a multiple-choice questionnaire.  
We distinguish our use of the term attention from the way others 
use it with respect to survey validity. Researchers, to ensure the 
validity of a survey, may implement an attention check to identify 
careless or unengaged respondents and allow researchers to screen 
them from the analyzed data.65 In general, they are interested in a 
binary determination—that is, whether the respondent is paying 
attention or not. In contrast, we are examining a more nuanced 
conception, where the type of answer provides insight into the 
respondent’s continuous level of attention. Our conception of attention 
uses a higher bar than a typical attention-check question to reflect the 
context in which MTurk is being used. In the context of legal 
scholarship, researchers use MTurk to ask questions that are 
reasonably complex, and require a nontrivial amount of attention to 
understand. As such, the level of attention should be more than simply 
confirming that a human has glanced at the questions. 
B. Results  
We begin by plotting the overall proportion of correct answers 
for each question and present the results in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows 
that there is substantial heterogeneity in accuracy across questions. 
Whereas about 90% of respondents answered question 9 correctly, only 
about 10% gave the correct answer to question 4. Overall, our 
respondents were more successful in answering the logic questions than 
the math questions, although this is not universally true—the second 
most difficult question, as measured by the number of respondents who 
answered it incorrectly, was a logic question.  
 
 64. The exception was the numeracy question, which asked respondents: “Which of the fol-
lowing numbers is the largest?” Respondents were required to select from among six options. The 
full question text is reproduced in Appendix A. 
 65. One such example of an attention check is the following question: “There are five choices 
below. Please mark the middle choice.” See Franki Y.H. Kung et al., Are Attention Check Questions 
a Threat to Scale Validity?, 67 APPLIED PSYCHOL. 264, 265 (2018) (describing the purpose of atten-
tion checks).  
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FIGURE 1: PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS WHO ANSWERED EACH 
QUESTION CORRECTLY 
 
 
We then compare the overall performance across the four groups 
in Figure 2. Already, with this completely nonparametric approach, 
there appear to be clear differences between the four groups. The scores 
increase monotonically from Group 1 to Group 4. The histograms also 
reveal that the shape of the distributions vary across the four groups, 
suggesting that while different compensation systems improve perfor-
mance, the effects may differ across questions. We then extend this 
analysis and present the average raw performance of each group, as 
well as their performance on the math and logic questions, in Figure 3. 
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FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF CORRECT ANSWERS, BY GROUP 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3: AVERAGE PROPORTION OF CORRECT ANSWERS,  
BY GROUP AND TYPE OF QUESTION 
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Despite our experimental design, it is always possible that there 
could be other differences between the four groups. To account for these 
differences as much as possible, we also estimate the relative 
performance of each group using a multivariate regression, which 
allows us to control for the respondents’ self-reported age, gender, 
educational attainment, and income. The estimated differences in 
performance are presented in Table 2. Details on the regression 
specification, as well as the full list of results, are reserved for the 
appendix. As it turns out, the addition of controls does not materially 
change the relative performance across groups.  
 
TABLE 2: PERFORMANCE DIFFERENCES ACROSS TREATMENT GROUPS—
ALL QUESTIONS 
 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Group 2 0.575**   
p-value (0.003)   
Group 3 0.753*** 0.178  
p-value (0.000) (0.350)  
Group 4 1.047*** 0.472* 0.293 
p-value (0.000) (0.014) (0.124) 
*** p<0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p<0.05 
Each cell presents the difference in coefficients between the group indicated in the 
row and the group indicated in the column. So, for example, the first cell shows 
that, on average, the number of correct questions for participants in Group 2 was 
0.575 higher than it was for participants in Group 1. p-values of F-tests under the 
null hypothesis that the two coefficients are the same are presented below in 
parentheses. 
As Table 2 makes clear, participants in Groups 2, 3, and 4 
substantially outperform participants in Group 1. Group 4 has the 
highest overall performance, and its performance differential is 
impressive. Participants in Group 4 score, on average, 1.05 points 
higher than those in Group 1. Given that this is a test out of ten points, 
this improvement represents over 10% of the total possible score. Even 
more impressive, this differential represents about 20% of the average 
score of participants in Group 1.66 Group 4 also substantially 
outperforms Group 2, although the magnitude of this outperformance 
is less than half as large. While the point estimate on the difference 
 
 66. The average raw score of participants in Group 1 was 5.188 points (out of a possible ten 
points). 
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between Group 4 and Group 3 is positive, the difference is not quite 
statistically significant.  
Even though the addition of controls has little effect on the 
relative performance across groups, these multivariate regressions 
have a second benefit, which is that they allow us to estimate 
performance differentials across the demographic characteristics. We 
discuss these differences in more detail below in Section II.C.5. 
Next, we divide the questions into math questions and logic 
questions and perform the same analysis. The results are presented in 
Table 3. Panel A presents the results relating to the four math 
questions, and Panel B presents the results relating to the six logic 
questions. The full set of coefficient estimates is presented in Appendix 
B, Table 4.  
 
TABLE 3: PERFORMANCE DIFFERENCES ACROSS TREATMENT 
GROUPS—BY QUESTION TYPE 
  
Panel A: Math Questions 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Group 2 0.393*** 
p-value (0.000) 
Group 3 0.165 -0.229*  
p-value (0.115) (0.027)  
Group 4 0.421*** 0.028 0.256* 
p-value (0.000) (0.789) (0.013) 
Panel B: Logic Questions 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Group 2 0.182   
p-value (0.168)   
Group 3 0.589*** 0.407**  
p-value (0.000) (0.002)  
Group 4 0.626*** 0.444*** 0.037 
p-value (0.000) (0.001) (0.777) 
*** p<0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p<0.05  
Each cell presents the difference in coefficients between the group indicated in the 
row and the group indicated in the column. Panel A presents the results for the four 
math questions, and Panel B presents the results for the six logic questions. p-
values of F-tests under the null hypothesis that the two coefficients are the same 
are presented below in parentheses.  
Table 3 demonstrates an interesting dimension of heterogeneity. 
Specifically, the incentivized groups (Groups 2 and 4) seem to perform 
substantially better on the math questions than the non-incentivized 
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groups (Groups 1 and 3). For example, Group 2 substantially 
outperforms Group 3 in this subsample, despite the fact that, as shown 
in Table 2, there is no difference in the overall performance of the two 
groups. Group 4 also substantially outperforms Group 3 in this 
treatment, despite the fact that the difference was not statistically 
significant overall. While the point estimates are lower than they were 
in Table 2, this decrease is partially related to the fact that there were 
only four math questions. In fact, the coefficient estimates are quite 
large relative to the means—for example, the 0.23 point difference 
between Group 3 and Group 2 represents a performance gap of about 
15% relative to the average performance in Group 3. 
Panel B demonstrates the opposite pattern. Here, the difference 
appears to be between the high base groups (Groups 3 and 4) and the 
low base groups (Groups 1 and 2). For example, both Groups 3 and 4 
substantially outperform Group 2 (as well as Group 1). In contrast, the 
differential between Groups 1 and 2 is much smaller in this subsample 
and is not statistically significant.  
So far, the results in Table 2 and Table 3 suggest a 
straightforward story: the performance of MTurk workers is sensitive 
to compensation structure, but in a very specific way. Performance on 
questions that involve exerting effort—that is, the math questions—is 
sensitive to the bonus payments. In contrast, performance on questions 
that simply involve paying attention—basic logic questions—is 
sensitive to the base pay offered. Stated another way: bonuses motivate 
workers to exert more effort, while higher base pay increases their level 
of attention. We discuss this phenomenon in greater detail in Section 
II.C.  
We also investigate the relationship between compensation, 
time spent, and performance. To account for the fact that some 
respondents may have opened the questionnaire and then returned to 
complete it later, we winsorize the time spent variable at the 5% level.67 
We begin with Table 4, which summarizes the average time spent by 
group. The most noticeable aspect of this figure is that the amount of 
time spent between Groups 1 through 3 is virtually identical; the 
differences among these groups are not statistically significant. 
Participants in Group 4, in contrast, did spend substantially more time 
 
 67. Winsorizing involves recoding the first 5% of the values to the fifth percentile, and the 
top 5% to the values of the ninety-fifth percentile. This form of censoring helps to mitigate the 
potentially distortionary effect of outliers. See Alan Reifman & Kristina Keyton, Winsorize, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RESEARCH DESIGN 1637 (Neil J. Salkind ed., 2012).  
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completing the questionnaire. This difference is highly statistically 
significant.68 
 
FIGURE 4: TIME SPENT ANSWERING THE QUESTIONNAIRE, BY GROUP 
 
 
 
The results so far suggest that the performance differential 
across groups will not be fully captured by time spent completing the 
questionnaire. To confirm this, we include the time spent variable in 
the regression. This inclusion allows us to disentangle the direct 
relationship between the compensation structure and performance 
from any indirect effect that flows through time the worker spent 
completing the assignment. While the coefficient on time spent was 
positive and statistically significant, the magnitude was quite small—
approximately 10% of the size of the performance differential between 
Groups 1 and 2, and an even smaller percentage of the difference 
between Group 1 and Groups 3 or 4. Perhaps even more importantly, 
the inclusion of the time spent variable causes the coefficients on the 
group variables to change only very slightly, indicating that the 
performance differential observed between groups is, at most, only 
 
 68. Specifically, using this measure in pairwise comparisons, the difference between the av-
erage time spent between Group 4 and each of Group 1, Group 2, and Group 3 is statistically 
significant at the 0.001 level.  
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weakly related to any differences in time spent across groups. The full 
set of coefficient estimates is presented in Appendix B, Table 5. 
Finally, we investigate whether the characteristics of the 
respondents in the groups differed in any systematic ways. To that end, 
we compare the observable demographic characteristics across the four 
groups. In general, the demographic point estimates are very similar. 
The biggest difference is in educational attainment,69 where we find 
that Group 1 had significantly more highly educated respondents 
(respondents with more than a bachelor’s degree) than the other three 
groups. As mentioned in Section III.A, this may be related to the fact 
that MTurk workers who had participated in one of our HITs were 
precluded from participating in subsequent HITs. To the extent that 
very highly educated individuals might be more inclined to participate 
in an academic study, this may not be surprising.  
One potential concern that this difference in educational 
attainment raises is that there could also be selection on other 
unobservable factors. While not ideal, to the extent that any selection 
exists, we would expect those individuals to perform disproportionately 
well on the questionnaire due to some combination of experience and 
aptitude. In other words, it is likely to bias our results towards finding 
higher performance in Group 1, and lower performance in later groups 
(such as Group 4). Given the likely direction of this bias, if anything, 
our results are likely to understate the differences between groups that 
would be observed in the absence of this selection effect.  
C. Interpreting Our Results  
In this Section, we interpret our results and discuss four 
implications of our findings. First, we discuss the marginal effects of 
incentives versus higher base pay. Next, we discuss the implications of 
using time spent as a proxy for effort. Third, we discuss the costs 
associated with each of the compensation structures, as well as the 
average cost per correct question. We then discuss the differences in 
these measures between the math and the logic questions. Finally, we 
 
 69. There were only four other pairwise comparisons that were statistically distinguishable 
at the 5% level. Given that there are a total of seventy-two pairwise comparisons, we would expect 
that, on average, 3.6 comparisons would be statistically significant at the 5% level by random 
chance. Observing four comparisons that are statistically distinguishable at the 5% level is there-
fore entirely consistent with random chance, and does not represent a concern. The full set of 
estimates is in Appendix B, Table 7. 
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discuss the relationship between performance and demographic 
variables in our experiment.  
1. Incentives v. Base Pay 
As mentioned in Section II.B, the results in Table 2 and  
Table 3 suggest that the compensation structure has differential effects 
between different types of questions. In particular, we found that 
participants’ performance on questions that involve exerting effort—
that is, on questions involving solving mathematical problems—is 
highly sensitive to the payment of bonuses. In contrast, we found that 
participants’ performance on questions that involve paying close 
attention to the question—that is, on questions involving logic—is 
highly sensitive to the level of base pay offered. This observation is 
particularly noteworthy given that, in contrast to a large number of 
questionnaires fielded on MTurk, our design forced respondents to 
enter typed text rather than simply clicking on an answer from a 
multiple-choice list. To the extent that this requirement affected our 
results, it is likely to mitigate any general tendency towards 
inattention.70 That we still find differences between groups, particularly 
with respect to the logic questions, is therefore even more noteworthy.   
We believe that the most natural interpretation of this result is 
that MTurk workers respond differently to the payment of incentives 
than they do to higher base pays. Whereas incentives seem to induce 
workers to exert effort, it does not seem to induce them to read 
questions more carefully. One potential explanation for this differential 
effect is that the MTurk workers interpret a high base pay as a signal 
that the requester (that is, the experimenter) places a high value on the 
task. This then leads to two non-exclusive potential inferences. The first 
is that respondents believe that, because the requester places a high 
value on the task, she may have higher standards for the work 
performed and is therefore more likely to reject the work performed. 
Respondents dislike this outcome, as it results in nonpayment. Given 
that hirers on MTurk can restrict participation by worker reputation,71 
 
 70. Indeed, while participants could enter any text they wanted, the respondents do not ap-
pear to have entered text randomly. For example, on several occasions, respondents typed out 
answers along the lines of “I don’t know” or “I don’t remember the formula.” 
 71. See Eyal Peer, Reputation as a Sufficient Condition for Data Quality on Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk, 46 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 1023 (2014) (observing that worker reputation on MTurk 
closely correlates with worker performance). 
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it follows that MTurk workers care about reputation, even beyond the 
fact that they are not compensated for rejected work.  
A second non-exclusive interpretation is that participants 
believe that the highly compensated task is a precursor to a subsequent 
task (or several additional tasks). For example, MTurk allows 
requesters to assign workers to “Qualification Types” and includes a 
score from zero to one hundred for each Qualification Type.72 The 
requester can then use these Qualification Types later for subsequent 
tasks.73 If MTurk workers believe that above-market wages could 
suggest that the requester is really seeking to qualify workers for later 
tasks, they might be inclined to answer more carefully in anticipation 
of potentially lucrative future opportunities.74 Under both of these 
explanations, MTurk workers are behaving strategically and trying to 
infer the underlying motivations or desires of the requester based on 
the above-market compensation. This is consistent with the observed 
non-naivety of many MTurk workers.75  
In contrast, bonuses do not seem to induce workers to perform 
better at the basic logic questions (that is, those that rely on carefully 
reading the question), but do seem to induce them to do better at the 
math questions (that is, those that rely on effort). This difference 
suggests that bonuses, while improving performance, may not 
necessarily induce increased attention among participants. Accordingly, 
the efficacy of bonuses is likely higher for sweat-of-the-brow type 
questions where effort matters. 
2. Time Spent as a Proxy for Effort 
A second major implication of our findings is that the amount of 
time that an MTurk participant spends on a task may be a poor proxy 
for effort. We can see this clearly in two different ways. First, we see 
that between Groups 1 and 2, and Groups 1 and 3, there is a substantial 
improvement in average performance, with no accompanying increase 
in average time spent. Moreover, despite the performance differential 
across question types between Groups 2 and 3, there is no difference in 
time spent. Both of these findings suggest that any differences in 
 
72. See Amazon Mechanical Turk: Requester User Interface Guide, AMAZON WEB SERVICES 52–-
54 (2019), https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSMechTurk/latest/RequesterUI/amt-ui.pdf#  Manag-
ingQualificationTypes [https://perma.cc/HKZ3-C9Q4]. 
73. See id. 
 74. While we think that this is plausible, it is, of course, somewhat speculative.  
 75. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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performance cannot be attributed to the amount of time the MTurk 
participants spent answering the questions.  
Second, as discussed in Section II.B, we found that including 
time spent as a control variable hardly changed the relationship 
between group and performance, suggesting that the differences 
between groups in terms of performance are largely unrelated to any 
differences in time spent. Taken together, these results suggest that 
using time spent as a proxy for effort may be problematic.  
The issue of time as a function of effort is a familiar concept in 
the legal profession. Hourly billing is a long-established practice by 
which lawyers charge for their services.76 Prior to hourly billing, 
lawyers were compensated primarily through standardized fees. As 
legal work became more complex, and the time incurred more variable, 
the legal profession borrowed from the accounting world to introduce 
hourly billing.77 In the aftermath of the 2008 recession, and with the 
emergence of legal technology, law firms have explored other 
alternatives. For example, clients at large law firms began to resist the 
traditional hourly billing model, resulting in firms offering flat fees, 
contingency fees, and “collars” (an agreed-upon range of fees where the 
counsel receives a bonus if the actual fees fall below the range and the 
client receives a discount if the actual fees fall above the range).78 
3. Costs Associated with Each Group 
A third implication of our results is that, as the saying goes, “you 
get what you pay for.”79 In particular, as we move from Group 1 to 
Group 2 or 3, and from Group 2 (and, to a lesser extent, Group 3) to 
Group 4, performance increases. At the same time, of course, the 
average cost also increases. Indeed, the cost ends up rising faster than 
the performance, meaning that the cost per correct answer also 
 
 76. For an interesting early discussion of hourly billing, see SPECIAL COMM. OF ECON. OF LAW 
PRACTICE FOR THE AM. BAR ASS’N, THE 1958 LAWYER AND HIS 1938 DOLLAR (1958). 
 77. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyers’ Fees and the Holy Grail: Where Should Clients Search 
for Value?, 77 JUDICATURE 187, 187 (1994). 
 78. See Jonathan D. Glater, Billable Hours Giving Ground at Law Firms, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
29, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/business/30hours.html [https://perma.cc/T82B-
X7PD] (describing client opposition to hourly rates); Catherine Ho, Law Firms Look for Alterna-
tives to the Billable Hour, WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2012) https://www.washingtonpost.com/busi-
ness/economy/law-firms-look-for-alternatives-to-the-billable-
hour/2012/04/15/gIQAeyW9JT_story.html [https://perma.cc/U285-B7HX] (describing alternative 
fee arrangements). 
 79. See KURT VONNEGUT, CAT’S CRADLE 128 (Dial Press Trade Paperbacks 2010) (1963). 
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increases as we move across Groups. Figure 5 summarizes these 
results.  
As Figure 5 makes clear, the largest jump is between Group 2 
and Group 3, where we find that both the average cost and the average 
cost per correct answer almost double (from $1.05 to $2.10, and from 
$0.18 to $0.35, respectively). Part of this is due to the fee structure 
employed by MTurk. While HITs with ten or more assignments (which 
includes HITs containing surveys with ten or more respondents) are 
charged a 40% fee, bonuses are only charged a 20% fee.80 While this 
accounts for some of the gap, that portion is relatively small: looking 
instead at average total compensation and average compensation per 
correct answer, the figures for Group 2 and Group 3 are $0.83 and $1.50, 
and $0.14 and $0.25, respectively. Overall, the average compensation 
and the average compensation per correct answer in Group 2 is roughly 
55% of that in Group 3. Both cost and compensation per correct answer 
rise even further when we move to Group 4, where we find that the cost 
per correct answer is about $0.40 (and the compensation per correct 
answer is about $0.30).  
 
FIGURE 5: COSTS AND COMPENSATION FOR ALL QUESTIONS, BY GROUP 
 
 
 
The more subtle implication of these results—going beyond the 
“you get what you pay for” maxim—is that the marginal cost of 
 
 80. Pricing, AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/pricing (last visited Sept. 
10, 2019) [https://perma.cc/JM9A-CXSX].  
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increased performance is quite high. Our inference is that there may be 
an upper bound to the performance that can be reasonably expected 
from MTurk participants. One might be able to dramatically improve 
performance by paying MTurk workers substantially more than typical 
rates. But doing so, depending on the assignment, may distort findings, 
either by drawing on an anomalistic population or encouraging effort 
that is incongruous with the real world. 
4. Heterogeneity in Costs Across Question Types  
The differences between Groups 2 and 3, discussed in  
Section II.C.3, suggest that bonuses may be a more cost-effective way 
to increase performance overall than a higher base pay. In fact, we can 
push this analysis further by distinguishing between math and logic 
questions. To do so, we repeat the analysis in Figure 5 separately for 
these two groups of questions.81 The results are presented in Figure 6 
and Figure 7 for the math questions and the logic questions, 
respectively.  
  
 
 81. In order to do this, we must attribute the costs and compensation between the two groups 
of questions. For Groups 1 and 3 (where there is no incentive component), we simply divide the 
total cost and compensation between the questions on a pro rata basis. Because there were four 
math questions and six logic questions, this resulted in attributing 40% of the cost and the com-
pensation to the math questions, and 60% to the logic questions. For Groups 2 and 4 (where there 
was an incentive component in addition to the base component), we attributed the base compen-
sation in the same way. We then added the incentive component based on the number of math 
questions that the individual answered correct to compute the cost and compensation for the math 
questions. The cost and compensation for the logic questions was computed analogously.  
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FIGURE 6: COSTS AND COMPENSATION FOR MATH QUESTIONS,  
BY GROUP 
 
 
Figure 6 shows that, when we restrict attention to the math 
questions, the average cost (and compensation) increase in moving from 
Group 1 to Group 2 is offset by the increase in correct answers. As a 
result, the average costs (and compensation) per correct answer are 
virtually identical. In contrast, the average costs (and compensation) 
per correct answer jump dramatically in moving from Group 2 to Group 
3, actually overshooting the values in Group 4. Figure 7, which is 
limited  to the logic questions, tells a different story: the pattern 
displayed in Figure 7 is generally similar to that in Figure 5, albeit 
somewhat more muted. We discuss the implications of this further in 
Sections III.C and III.D. 
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FIGURE 7: COSTS AND COMPENSATION FOR LOGIC QUESTIONS,  
BY GROUP 
 
5. Relationship Between Demographics and Performance 
A final implication of our results is that demographic variables 
of MTurk participants may represent a rather blunt measure of 
participant ability. To see this, we note that many of the demographic 
variables that one might think of as relevant predictors of performance 
on math and logic questions (including educational attainment, 
employment status, and race) are not statistically significant. This 
result holds even after controlling for the participant’s compensation 
group.  
We did find other demographic characteristics that correlated 
with performance. Some variables, including age, were statistically 
significant, although not necessarily in the direction that one might 
predict a priori. Others, such as whether the respondent identified as 
Hispanic, might have been correlated with English language skills, 
which is something that we did not directly ask about in the survey. 
Given the rich literature on the returns to education,82 for example, the 
 
 82. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (3d ed. 1993); David Card, Estimating the Return to 
Schooling: Progress on Some Persistent Econometric Problems, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1127 (2001); 
James J. Heckman et al., Earnings Functions, Rates of Return and Treatment Effects: The Mincer 
Equation and Beyond, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION (Eric A. Hanushek & 
Finis Welch eds., 2006); Philip Oreopoulos & Uros Petronijevic, Making College Worth It: A Review 
of Research on the Returns to Higher Education (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
19053, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2269476 
[https://perma.cc/E37H-X5WF]. 
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overall non-significance of demographic factors suggests that the type 
of workers who choose to work within MTurk may not be representative 
of the broader population. The full set of coefficient estimates is 
presented in Appendix B, Table 6.  
Our findings suggest that the efficacy of an MTurk survey 
depends on the population group that the survey is designed to capture. 
Our results provide evidence that MTurk participants reflect a broad 
distribution of the population. For each compensation structure in our 
experiment, some respondents answered every question correctly. At 
the same time—with the exception of the high plus incentive group—
some respondents answered every question incorrectly. 
Our results also reveal two other phenomena: One, MTurk is 
less effective at drawing from a narrowly defined subset of the 
population. Each compensation structure generated a wide range of 
responses. Two, our results suggest that there is an upper bound in the 
performance of respondent pools recruited using MTurk. Depending on 
the subset of the population one is trying to reach, MTurk respondents 
may not be a valid comparison.  
The upshot is that our findings have direct relevance to the use 
of surveys in legal research. In some contexts, MTurk may provide a 
germane comparison. For example, an MTurk survey may go a long way 
in informing our understanding of jury deliberations, as both MTurk 
and juries draw widely from the general population.83 Conversely, 
asking MTurk participants to evaluate promulgations by the 
Environmental Protection Agency may yield less insight into how 
administrative agencies approach rulemaking (it may, however, still 
say something about how a layperson thinks about such matters).  
Ultimately, our findings suggest that MTurk is neither a 
panacea nor a scourge for survey research. It is simply a mechanism to 
capture the views of a subset of the population, large or small. It works 
best when the MTurk participants accord with the desired population 
subset. When MTurk participants have little in common with the 
desired population subset, however, it effectively compares apples with 
oranges. Ultimately, legal scholarship using MTurk turns on the 
 
 83. Scholars note that jurors reach different results when deliberating individually than col-
lectively. See David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, Information Aggregation, Rationality, and 
the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 34, 34–35 (1996).  
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assumption that it provides a credible proxy for the desired population 
subset. Stated in the negative: garbage in, garbage out.84 
III. BEST PRACTICES  
We now discuss the implications of our results for other studies. 
Overall, while there are undoubtably benefits to using MTurk, our 
results suggest that it should be used with caution. In this Part, we 
draw on the results of our experiment and suggest several best practices 
that researchers should adopt in using MTurk for legal and social 
science scholarship. In particular, we discuss five specific and concrete 
suggestions that come out of our study. These suggestions are intended 
to strengthen both the quality of the underlying studies and the 
interpretability of any resulting papers based on such studies. 
A. Provide Minimum Disclosure of Research Methodology  
A thorough review of published articles in the legal literature 
that relied on MTurk samples revealed that most provide only a high-
level discussion of the research methodology. While this may be for the 
sake of parsimony, these details are frequently important for 
interpreting and evaluating the results in the paper. For example, most 
studies we reviewed do not report the compensation provided to 
participants. Given our experimental results—that responses are 
highly sensitive to compensation—participant compensation (both in 
terms of level and bonus structure, if any) should be viewed as a 
material fact and therefore should be clearly disclosed and discussed in 
the description of the research methodology. 
This minimum disclosure should extend beyond the 
compensation structure. Many of the studies we reviewed omitted any 
discussion of a large number of relevant features, including the number 
of participants (both the number initially sought and the number 
included in the final analysis), the amount of time participants spent 
completing the questionnaire (both the amount of time participants 
were told that the questionnaire should take to complete and the 
average amount of time actually spent), the way the task was described 
to potential participants on the MTurk platform, when the HIT was 
 
 84. The origins of the terms are credited to IBM programmer George Feuchsel. See What is 
Garbage in Garbage Out?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.org/what-is-garbage-in-garbage-
out.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2019) [https://perma.cc/TF5R-6AH4]. 
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posted on MTurk, when the last eligible participant completed the HIT 
(and, by implication, the total amount of time between when the HIT 
was posted and when the last eligible participant completed it), and any 
qualifications required of MTurk workers (such as, for example, their 
location).85 Because all of these features of the study are known to the 
researchers at the time that the study is being fielded, reporting this 
information is virtually costless. To the extent that researchers are 
concerned about clogging their papers with methodological details, this 
information can always be relegated to footnotes or to a methodological 
appendix. This approach would allow authors to maintain a degree of 
parsimony in the main text, while also preserving access to important 
information about the research methodology.  
B. Ensure Robustness by Varying Compensation  
In our review of the literature, we found only two studies that 
fielded their questionnaires with different compensation levels or 
structures, out of the ninety-eight that we reviewed.86 Given our finding 
that respondents are sensitive to compensation, using only a single 
compensation level or structure leaves open the possibility that the 
results reflect the compensation structure more than they do the 
question of interest.  
A second suggestion that comes out of our experiment is that 
researchers should field their questionnaire more than once, varying 
the compensation provided to participants each time. This would act as 
a robustness check—to the extent that the results are similar, this 
would help to ensure that the results are not artifacts of the 
 
 85. Note that we do not mean simply stating the requirement, since potential respondents 
may misstate their eligibility in order to participate. Rather, we mean Amazon requirements, 
which preclude ineligible workers based on information that Amazon has about the individual. 
Researchers should clearly state any eligibility requirements, as well as which requirements were 
screened for thorough self-reporting and which were imposed by qualifications.   
 86. One of these studies raised the compensation offered from $0.50 to $0.75 “to expedite data 
collection,” Christopher T. Robertson et al., Perceptions of Efficacy, Morality, and Politics of Poten-
tial Cadaveric Organ-Transplantation Reforms, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101, 129 (2014), pre-
sumably because the authors felt that there was insufficient interest in participating in their sur-
vey at the lower compensation. The authors removed respondents who completed the survey in 
under 6.99 minutes, implying that the maximum hourly rate offered to respondents was about 
$4.29 under the lower compensation, and $6.43 under the higher compensation. The mean hourly 
rate was presumably substantially less than this. The second offered two different levels of com-
pensation—$0.25 and $0.50. Garrett & Mitchell, supra note 35, at 492. While the authors did not 
discuss their rationale for offering two different compensation levels, they reported that “the same 
patterns hold when we . . . compare the participants receiving 25 cents vs. 50 cents.” Id.  
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compensation structure. This, in turn, would lend support to the idea 
that there may be some external validity to the results. To the extent 
that differently compensated participants produce different results, 
understanding this would give researchers an opportunity to explore 
the phenomenon of interest more deeply. 
C. Recognize that Time Spent May Be a Poor Proxy for Effort 
Until recently, the legal profession had embraced the hourly 
billing model, which treated lawyers’ time as a proxy for effort. 
Economic and technological forces have compelled firms—large and 
small—to revisit this maxim. In addition to the alternative fee 
arrangements discussed above, law firms are increasingly willing to 
discount the cost of their services in an effort to attract and retain 
clients, further weakening the hourly billing model.87 Our experiment 
reaches a similarly nuanced conclusion that time may be a poor proxy 
for effort. 
This is not to say that time conveys no information. Very low 
time spent on a survey may be a credible signal that the MTurk worker 
did not exert a good-faith effort on an assignment. We came across 
MTurk studies that excluded responses where the worker spent less 
than a threshold amount of time.88 
At the same time, we found that workers who spent more time 
on the questions did not perform meaningfully better. Workers who 
spent more time did score higher, but this difference was very small and 
not statistically significant. Differences in compensation (that is, 
membership in Group 2, Group 3, or Group 4 versus Group 1) had an 
effect that was at least ten times greater than an additional minute of 
time. Our takeaway here is that researchers should report the time 
workers spend on assignments, but be wary of using it as a proxy. 
D. Distinguish Between Subjective and Objective Questions,  
and Tailor Compensation Accordingly 
A fourth recommendation is that researchers should distinguish 
between subjective questions (questions where researchers are asking 
 
 87. See, e.g., Roy Strom, How the Am Law 100 Left $4.4B on the Table in 2018, AM. LAW. (Apr. 
23, 2019, 9:50 AM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2019/04/23/clients-are-demanding-dis-
counts-and-leaving-law-firms-at-a-loss/ [https://perma.cc/X86P-8NV4]. 
 88. See, e.g., Cicchini & White, supra note 32, at 28 (rejecting responses from those who spent 
fewer than three minutes on the survey).  
           
1666 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:5:1633 
 
participants for their opinions) and objective questions (where there is 
a correct answer that the researcher can determine ex ante). It bears 
repeating that our study looks only at objective questions. At the same 
time, we ask questions that correlate with effort (math) and attention 
(logic). It is our study’s observations on the latter characteristic—
attention—that we believe can shed some light on subjective questions. 
Our results clearly show that incentives, coupled with a low 
base, provide a cost-effective way to improve participant performance. 
In a setting where the researchers are interested in posing questions 
with objective answers, and/or where the goal is to induce participants 
to exert effort in solving problems, this type of compensation structure 
may be preferable.  
In the majority of the studies we reviewed, the researchers were 
interested in participants’ answers to subjective questions. Sometimes 
this manifests itself as a simple survey asking participants about their 
beliefs or preferences.89 Others are designed as experiments—for 
example, a study related to jury instructions might investigate whether 
a change in jury instructions makes the respondent more likely to rule 
in favor of the defendant,90 or a study related to taxpayer audits might 
investigate whether the way audits are conducted (randomly or based 
on past behavior) affects cheating.91 
In these types of studies, the researcher is interested in eliciting 
the respondents’ honest and thoughtful answers and reactions. As a 
result, the researcher may be more interested in inducing the 
respondent to pay attention—and to answer the question attentively—
than she is in inducing the respondents to exert effort to solve a 
problem. The subjective nature of the question means that there is no 
single “correct” answer. That said, one would still like respondents to 
pay attention to the question, and think carefully before providing a 
response. 
In these settings, our results show that a higher base 
compensation—substantially above the common rates of $0.25 to $1.00 
per ten minutes (for an implied hourly rate of $1.50 to $6.00)—may be 
required to induce participants to answer attentively.92 While such 
 
 89. See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 32, at 1204–06; Cass R. Sunstein, People Prefer System 2 
Nudges (Kind Of), 66 DUKE L.J. 121, 155 (2016). 
 90. See, e.g., Cicchini & White, supra note 32, at 23. 
 91. See e.g., Satterthwaite, supra note 39, at 8–9. 
 92. Indeed, even with the higher compensation, a substantial fraction of participants still 
failed to answer our logic questions correctly, indicating that they were still not answering atten-
tively.  
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higher compensation rates do cut against the cost effectiveness of 
MTurk as a research platform, our evidence shows that they also 
substantially improve performance, making the results of studies that 
rely on it far more reliable. We believe that this is a worthwhile tradeoff. 
E. Recognize a Potential Upper Bound in the Quality of MTurk 
Participants  
A fifth recommendation is that researchers should recognize a 
potential upper bound to the quality of responses achievable by MTurk 
participants. Whether the pool of MTurk participants is representative 
of the broader U.S. population remains an open question: some studies 
have found it to be fairly representative,93 while others have found it to 
be less so.94 Our study does not address the question of whether the pool 
of MTurk participants is broadly representative, as this was never part 
of our research design. However, we do find evidence that the 
performance of participants drawn from MTurk may be bounded at a 
relatively modest level. For example, even under our most generous 
compensation structure, the average number of correct questions was 
less than 6.3 out of 10.  
Average performance on the math questions was even more 
disappointing: even in the highest compensated group, the average 
score was about 1.772 out of 4 (or about 44%).95 Restricting attention to 
respondents who reported having at least an associate degree does 
nothing to improve average performance: in fact, the average 
performance actually falls by the very tiny amount of 0.004 (to 1.768 
out of 4).96 This is despite the fact that the math questions are drawn 
from the curriculum for ninth grade and below.  
 
 93. See, e.g., Berinsky et al., supra note 12, at 352 (finding that MTurk respondents are more 
representative of the U.S. population than in-person convenience samples, but less representative 
than subjects in web-based panels or national probability samples such as the Current Population 
Survey).  
 94. See, e.g., Gabriele Paolacci & Jesse Chandler, Inside the Turk: Understanding Mechanical 
Turk as a Participant Pool, 23 ASS’N FOR PSYCHOL. SCI. 184, 184–85 (2014) (finding that workers, 
while diverse, are not representative of the populations from which they are drawn). 
 95. The performance differential on the math questions between respondents with an associ-
ate degree or higher and respondents with less than an associate degree is not statistically signif-
icant at the 5% (or even the 10%) level.  
 96. Restricting attention to participants with at least a bachelor’s degree also makes very 
little difference—the number of correct answers out of four rises to 1.858 out of four (or 46%). The 
performance differential on the math questions between respondents with a bachelor’s degree or 
higher and respondents with less than a bachelor’s degree is not statistically significant at the 5% 
(or even the 10%) level.  
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The fact that the average quality of the responses is somewhat 
disappointing is not necessarily fatal to all applications of MTurk for 
legal research. Rather, whether the upper bound is problematic will 
depend on the specifics of the question at issue. For example, this may 
not be a serious problem in the context of a study designed to simulate 
the behavior of jurors if the researcher believes that the typical juror is 
drawn from a similar pool.97 On the other hand, this may be a bigger 
problem in the case of a study seeking to simulate the behavior of a 
more sophisticated pool of individuals than those available through 
MTurk.  
F. Create Objective Measures to Supplement Self-Reported 
Demographic Information 
A final, related recommendation from our study is that 
researchers should exercise caution in using demographic variables to 
control for factors such as participant ability, skill, or “quality.” As 
discussed in Section II.C.5, our study shows that standard demographic 
variables (such as education and age) do not perform as one would 
typically expect, suggesting that they may make for poor control 
variables. This, in turn, may create interpretative challenges and, at 
the extreme, cast doubt on certain findings.  
As such, even if the pool of MTurk respondents may be 
appropriate for the question of interest,98 it is worthwhile to construct 
an objective baseline measure of the quality of each respondent. For 
example, a researcher could include objective questions within the 
survey instrument, which would enable her to construct a standard, 
objective measure for each respondent. These measures could then 
supplement other control variables, such as demographic variables, in 
the analysis. Demographic measures are often poor proxies for the 
underlying measure of interest (for example, ability), exacerbated by 
unobservable selection for MTurk participation. For these reasons, 
simply relying on the standard demographic variables may be 
problematic. This reinforces our suggestion above that a more 
 
 97. See, e.g., Svein Magnussen et al., Beliefs about Factors Affecting the Reliability of Eyewit-
ness Testimony: A Comparison of Judges, Jurors and the General Public, 24 APPLIED COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOL. 122, 130 (2010) (describing how the jurors performed comparably to the general public 
with respect to the reliability and credibility of eyewitness testimony). 
 98. See discussion supra Section III.E.  
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appropriate measure of “quality” is one that is constructed from the 
inclusion of objective questions in the survey instrument itself.99 
CONCLUSION 
MTurk plays an increasingly prominent role in legal 
scholarship, providing scholars with access to individual responses 
quickly and cheaply. While it offers several attractive features, we 
identify two major concerns regarding the current use of MTurk in legal 
scholarship. We design an experiment and demonstrate that the 
performance of MTurk participants is highly sensitive to the 
compensation structure offered and that this sensitivity depends on the 
nature of the tasks involved. We draw on our experience and results to 
propose a series of best practices for legal scholars and law reviews to 
adopt in studies involving MTurk participants going forward. Our hope 
is that adoption of the guidelines will help to mitigate potential 
criticisms of studies relying on MTurk, thereby fostering richer and 
more fruitful scholarly discussions.  
  
 
 99. See discussion supra Section III.E.  
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APPENDIX A: QUESTION TEXT 
Question 1 [math]: Which of the following numbers is the largest?  
• 5/7 
• -0.6 
• -1/6 
• 0.004 
• 6/8 
• -2/7 
 
Question 2 [math]: If 4m – 2 = 5m+7, m =  ? 
Question 3 [math]: What is 2 x (8 – 3)2 + √4 ÷ 2? 
Question 4 [math]: The figure below depicts a square and a circle. The 
square has all its corners on the circle. The area of the square is equal 
to 400 square inches. What is the area of the circle? 
  
Question 5 [logic]: If you’re running a race and you pass the person in 
second place, what place are you in?  
Question 6 [logic]: A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died. How many 
are left?  
Question 7 [logic]: Emily’s father has three daughters. The first two are 
named April and May. What is the third daughter’s name?  
Question 8 [logic]: How many cubic feet of dirt are there in a hole that 
is 3 feet deep x 3 feet wide x 3 feet long? 
Question 9 [logic]: A man was born in 1955, how old is he on his 18th 
birthday? 
Question 10 [logic]: How many three cent stamps are in a dozen? 
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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
TABLE 4: FULL REGRESSION ESTIMATES  
(1) (2) (3) 
 All Questions Math Questions Logic Questions 
Group 2 0.575** 0.393*** 0.182  
(0.192) (0.104) (0.132) 
Group 3 0.753*** 0.165 0.589***  
(0.192) (0.104) (0.132) 
Group 4 1.047*** 0.421*** 0.626***  
(0.191) (0.104) (0.131) 
Female -0.350* -0.278*** -0.072  
(0.137) (0.074) (0.094) 
Associate or Bachelor’s Degree 0.014 0.131 -0.118 
(0.163) (0.089) (0.112) 
Graduate Degree -0.125 0.154 -0.279+ 
(0.228) (0.124) (0.157) 
High Income 0.113 0.151 -0.038  
(0.187) (0.102) (0.129) 
Age: [30–33] 0.316 0.008 0.308*  
(0.194) (0.106) (0.133) 
Age: [34–41] 0.586** -0.007 0.593***  
(0.182) (0.099) (0.125) 
Age: [42–100] 0.773*** 0.166 0.607***  
(0.192) (0.104) (0.132) 
Working Now 0.072 -0.062 0.134  
(0.186) (0.101) (0.127) 
Born in the US -0.409 -0.230 -0.179 
(0.367) (0.199) (0.252) 
Black -0.641** -0.058 -0.583***  
(0.240) (0.130) (0.165) 
Asian -0.222 0.143 -0.366+  
(0.309) (0.168) (0.212) 
Other Race -0.323 -0.108 -0.215  
(0.371) (0.201) (0.255) 
Hispanic -1.584*** -0.588*** -0.997***  
(0.237) (0.128) (0.162) 
Constant 5.548*** 1.662*** 3.886***  
(0.462) (0.251) (0.317) 
Number of Observations 986 986 986 
R2 0.122 0.068 0.135 
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.053 0.121 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p<0.05, + p>0.1 
This table presents coefficient estimates of OLS regressions. The dependent 
variable in Column (1) is the total number of questions answered correctly (out 
of a possible ten). The dependent variable in Column (2) is the total number of 
math questions answered correctly (out of a possible four). The dependent var-
iable in Column (1) is the total number of logic questions answered correctly 
(out of a possible six). High income is a dummy equal to one if the respondent 
reported a total household income before taxes during the past twelve months 
of at least $100,000. White is the omitted category for race. Other Race includes 
respondents who selected multiple categories. 
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TABLE 5: FULL REGRESSION ESTIMATES, WITH AND WITHOUT TIME 
SPENT VARIABLE  
(1) (2) (3) 
 All Questions All Questions All Questions 
Group 2 0.575** 0.574** 0.589**  
(0.192) (0.190) (0.191) 
Group 3 0.753*** 0.741*** 0.752***  
(0.192) (0.190) (0.191) 
Group 4 1.047*** 0.925*** 1.015***  
(0.191) (0.191) (0.191) 
Female -0.350* -0.359** -0.347*  
(0.137) (0.136) (0.136) 
Associate or Bachelor’s Degree 0.014 -0.02 0.010 
(0.163) (0.162) (0.163) 
Graduate Degree -0.125 -0.146 -0.113 
(0.228) (0.226) (0.227) 
High Income 0.113 0.112 0.117  
(0.187) (0.185) (0.186) 
Age: [30–33] 0.316 0.300 0.352+  
(0.194) (0.193) (0.194) 
Age: [34–41] 0.586** 0.602*** 0.608***  
(0.182) (0.180) (0.181) 
Age: [42–100] 0.773*** 0.749*** 0.808***  
(0.192) (0.190) (0.192) 
Working Now 0.072 0.088 0.075  
(0.186) (0.184) (0.185) 
Born in the US -0.409 -0.422 -0.409 
(0.367) (0.364) (0.365) 
Black -0.641** -0.704** -0.680**  
(0.240) (0.238) (0.239) 
Asian -0.222 -0.178 -0.200  
(0.309) (0.306) (0.308) 
Other Race -0.323 -0.302 -0.292  
(0.371) (0.367) (0.369) 
Hispanic -1.584*** -1.631*** -1.608***  
(0.237) (0.235) (0.236) 
Time Spent (winsorized)  0.050***  
  (0.011)  
Time Spent (not winsorized)   0.009** 
   (0.003) 
Constant 5.548*** 5.257*** 5.443***  
(0.462) (0.462) (0.461) 
Number of Observations 986 986 986 
R2 0.122 0.14 0.132 
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.125 0.117 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p<0.05, + p>0.1 
This table presents coefficient estimates of OLS regressions. The dependent variable 
is the total number of questions answered correctly (out of a possible ten). In Column 
(1), we repeate the analysis in Table 4. In Column (2), we add a control for the amount 
of time the participant spent completing the survey, winsorized at the 5% level (Time 
Spent (winsorized)). For robustness, in Column (3), we repeat the analysis with the 
raw time elapsed variable (Time Spent (not winsorized)).  High income is a dummy 
equal to one if the respondent reported a total household income before taxes during 
the past twelve months of at least $100,000. White is the omitted category for race. 
Other Race includes respondents who selected multiple categories.   
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TABLE 6: FULL REGRESSION ESTIMATES, WITH AND WITHOUT GROUP 
DUMMIES  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Questions Math Questions Logic Questions 
Group 2 
 
0.575** 
 
0.393*** 
 
0.182   
(0.192) 
 
(0.104) 
 
(0.132) 
Group 3 
 
0.753*** 
 
0.165 
 
0.589***   
(0.192) 
 
(0.104) 
 
(0.132) 
Group 4 
 
1.047*** 
 
0.421*** 
 
0.626***   
(0.191) 
 
(0.104) 
 
(0.131) 
Female -0.314* -0.350* -0.261*** -0.278*** -0.053 -0.072  
(0.139) (0.137) (0.075) (0.074) (0.095) (0.094) 
Associate or Bach-
elor’s Degree 
-0.050 0.014 0.109 0.131 -0.160 -0.118 
(0.165) (0.163) (0.089) (0.089) (0.114) (0.112) 
Graduate Degree -0.270 -0.125 0.109 0.154 -0.379* -0.279+ 
(0.230) (0.228) (0.124) (0.124) (0.158) (0.157) 
High Income 0.120 0.113 0.151 0.151 -0.031 -0.038  
(0.190) (0.187) (0.103) (0.102) (0.130) (0.129) 
Age: [30–33] 0.285 0.316 -0.004 0.008 0.290* 0.308*  
(0.197) (0.194) (0.106) (0.106) (0.135) (0.133) 
Age: [34–41] 0.552** 0.586** -0.022 -0.007 0.574*** 0.593***  
(0.184) (0.182) (0.099) (0.099) (0.126) (0.125) 
Age: [42–100] 0.737*** 0.773*** 0.156 0.166 0.581*** 0.607***  
(0.195) (0.192) (0.105) (0.104) (0.134) (0.132) 
Working Now 0.091 0.072 -0.062 -0.062 0.153 0.134  
(0.188) (0.186) (0.101) (0.101) (0.129) (0.127) 
Born in the US -0.401 -0.409 -0.246 -0.230 -0.156 -0.179 
(0.372) (0.367) (0.201) (0.199) (0.256) (0.252) 
Black -0.679** -0.641** -0.079 -0.058 -0.600*** -0.583***  
(0.243) (0.240) (0.131) (0.130) (0.167) (0.165) 
Asian -0.282 -0.222 0.112 0.143 -0.394+ -0.366+  
(0.313) (0.309) (0.169) (0.168) (0.215) (0.212) 
Other Race -0.389 -0.323 -0.141 -0.108 -0.247 -0.215  
(0.376) (0.371) (0.203) (0.201) (0.258) (0.255) 
Hispanic -1.636*** -1.584*** -0.611*** -0.588*** -1.024*** -0.997***  
(0.240) (0.237) (0.130) (0.128) (0.165) (0.162) 
Constant 6.200*** 5.548*** 1.950*** 1.662*** 4.250*** 3.886***  
(0.448) (0.462) (0.242) (0.251) (0.307) (0.317) 
Number of  
Observations 
986 986 986 986 986 986 
R2 0.094 0.122 0.047 0.068 0.106 0.135 
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.108 0.034 0.053 0.094 0.121 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p<0.05, + p>0.1 
This table presents coefficient estimates of OLS regressions. The dependent 
variable in Columns (1) and (2) is the total number of questions answered 
correctly (out of a possible ten). The dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) 
is the total number of math questions answered correctly (out of a possible four). 
The dependent variable in Columns (5) and (6) is the total number of logic 
questions answered correctly (out of a possible six). High income is a dummy 
equal to one if the respondent reported a total household income before taxes 
during the past twelve months of at least $100,000. White is the omitted 
category for race. Other Race includes respondents who selected multiple 
categories.  
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TABLE 7: DEMOGRAPHIC BALANCE 
 
Group 1  
v. Group 
2 
Group 1  
v. Group 
3 
Group 1  
v. Group 
4 
Group 2  
v. Group 
3 
Group 2  
v. Group 
4 
Group 3  
v. Group 
4 
Female 0.046 0.022 0.064 -0.024 0.018 0.042 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Bachelor’s Degree -0.030 -0.022 -0.030 0.009 0.001 -0.008 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Graduate Degree -0.076* -0.121*** -0.085* -0.045 -0.009 0.036 
 (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.030) (0.032) (0.029) 
High Income -0.011 -0.012 -0.013 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Age (years)  0.136 -0.500 -0.788 -0.636 -0.924 -0.288 
 (0.975) (0.934) (0.909) (0.950) (0.926) (0.882) 
Working Now -0.048 -0.020 0.024 0.028 0.072* 0.044 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.031) (0.035) (0.033) (0.032) 
Born in the US  -0.012 0.008 0.008 0.020 0.020 0.000 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) 
White 0.072* 0.068 0.056 -0.004 -0.016 -0.012 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) 
Black -0.064* -0.056* -0.016 0.008 0.048 0.040 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) 
Asian -0.004 -0.004 -0.024 0.000 -0.020 -0.020 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Other Race -0.004 -0.008 -0.016 -0.004 -0.012 -0.008 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Hispanic -0.032 -0.028 -0.040 0.004 -0.008 -0.012 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p<0.05 
This table presents pairwise comparisons of each demographic variable across 
treatment groups. Each demographic variable with the exception of Age is a 
dummy variable. The reported values are therefore the difference between the 
average proportion of respondents with the relevant characteristic in the first 
group, compared to the second group. The reported values are estimated by 
estimating an OLS regression with a dummy variable representing the second 
group listed on a sample that includes respondents from the first and second 
group. High income is a dummy equal to one if the respondent reported a total 
household income before taxes during the past twelve months of at least 
$100,000. Other Race includes respondents who selected multiple categories.  
 
 
